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Abstract
In this paper two models are contrasted whereby a corporation is seeking to finance the purchase of
a merchandise from a supplier through a profit and loss sharing contract.The first mode consist of financing
the purchase totally through equity. The second model is a new hybrid model that engages the supplier
in the process as a shareholder.Both models are based on the principle of profit and loss sharing which
suffers from the issue of moral hazard.This is manifestedin the form of the corporation shirking (providing
low effort) and/or misreporting profits. It is argued that under equity financing, where the financier is the
only shareholder, the corporation can hide part of the merchandise it sold and therefore misreport profits.
This is, however, not possible under hybrid financing where, in addition to the financier, the supplier is
interested in the financial reporting of the corporation. We apply a game theoretical approach where ,under
a hybrid financing, the financier and the supplier have mutual interest in true revenue reporting and therefore
constitute a coalition (one player) against the corporation. Our game incorporates the effect of sharing
markets and corporations’ discounts between the game participants under each model. We showtheoretically
that a non-conditional good Nash equilibrium exists under hybrid financing. This case does not apply to an
all equity financing where the existence of a good Nash equilibrium is conditional upon the financier and the
supplier sharing ratios. This shows that under the hybrid model the corporation is always induced to provide
more effort (not shirk) and truly report profits.
Keywords: PLS contracts, asymmetric information, Moral hazard, sharing ratio, Hybrid model. adverse
selection
1. Introduction
Profit and Loss Sharing models (PLS) in general represent modes of partnership between two or
several parties. whereby profits are shared according to a predetermined ratio and losses are born according
the partners’ capital contribution (Obaidullah, 2005)
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Full capacity of the parties involved coupled with their free consent are indispensable elements
for the PLS contract to be valid (Usmani, 2002). All parties contribute a certain capital with some or all
acting as agents and managers. One specific type of PLS contracts is the type existing in Islamic finance
referred to as Musharakah. In this specific mode of financing, . The Sharing ratio must be based on expected
future profits. It cannot be determined as a lump sum or a percentage of the capital investment , otherwise it
becomes a fixed income investment. The profit-sharing ratio can eventually be revised upon agreement of all
parties. Partners can , if they wish, offer a part of their profit to another partner (Obaidullah, 2005). In terms
of liability, the participants in a Musharakah contract normally have unlimited liabilities. The Musharakah
contract is terminated if (Usmani, 2002):
• The partnership was limited to a given time frame;
• The purpose of the partnership has been achieved;
• The continuity of the project is compromised by the withdrawal of one or several partners;
• Any of the partners die before the end of the agreement;
In the case of premature termination, the business shall be liquidated, and the settlement distributed prorata.
A partner cannot demand that another partner provides security in any form since they have the same rights
and obligations towards each other and since they are acting as agents for each other. However, in case of a
Musharakah agreement between the bank and the bank’s client, the bank can obtain adequate security from
the partners against possible misconduct and negligence to ensure the safety of the capital invested.
One specific type of Musharakah is diminishing Musharakah (Musharakah mutanaqisah), where one or sev-
eral partners progressively increase his/her share in the business or project (Warde, 2010).
An increasing interest is shown by many conventional institutions towards PLS contracts in the form of
Musharakah. This is manifested through the opening of Islamic windows to attract investors and depositors.
Islamic benchmarks were set to cope with its conventional counterparts. Examples include the Dow Jones
Islamic Market Index in New York and the FTSE Global Islamic Index in London (Abidi, 2009).
In 2007, more than 400 billion US Dollars were raised and 600 US Dollars billion were invested in different
sectors (Gierath, 2010)
There are many differences between conventional PLS contracts and Islamic Musharakah. The latter is
based on ethical considerations governed by the Islamic jurisprudence (Shari’ah). For example, Musharakah
is interest-free financing and prohibits the financing of illicit projects (gambling, casinos, wine and pornog-
raphy). This represents a major limitation to the number of investment opportunities that an Islamic bank
can undertake compared to their conventional counterparts.
Islamic Musharakah does not allow the partners to receive fixed compensation like their conventional coun-
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terparts. This also represents a drawback to the Islamic bank as it may lose due to the profit and loss sharing
principal. In addition, Islamic banks providing Musharakah suffer from higher asymmetric information
compared to their conventional counterparts as the entrepreneur may behave in opportunistic ways.
Our paper tries to introduce a new hybrid model to reduce this problem of asymmetric information using a
game theoretical approach. In fact, our model proposes giving a partial equity financing to a corporation.
The rest of the required fund is given as a debt to the corporation’s supplier who enters this game as a share-
holder.
This model tries to answer the following research questions:
• Can our model induce the financed corporation to perform better?
• Is there any equilibrium achieved in our model and if so is it better than a total equity financing model?
To answer these research questions, we provide a game theoretical approach comparing the payoffs of the
participants under our hybrid model and the total equity financing scenario. Because it is a new model, it is
not yet tested in a real case scenario which constitute its main limitation. We can remedy such limitation in
future extensions using real case simulations. Also, in the model, there are some of the parameters such as
the project’s payoffs which are not controllable. We can also think of whether the suppliers can be willing
to enter into such contracts. The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 starts with a literature review of asymmetric information in a financier-entrepreneur
environment. Section 3 represents the model. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 represents the
results. Finally, section 7 concludes with a summary and possible extensions.
2. Literature review
Despite the big development of Islamic financial literature, especially in the performance and effi-
ciency of banks there is a large gap that is not covered yet. For instance, academic literature does not provide
rigorous analysis of the financial capital structure in Islamic private equity (a form of Musharakah) projects,
their role under asymmetric information and how to deter opportunistic behaviour of the entrepreneur(Chatti
and Yousfi, 2010)
Many researches have tried to minimize the problem of asymmetric information. One such exam-
ple is the use of dissipative signals. For example, information sharing information is one method to reduce
the asymmetry of information. in consistency with this framework, it has been shown that credit bureaus can
increase efforts from borrowers (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). At the same time, information sharing may be
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used to reduce competition between banks (Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007). Furthermore, information shar-
ing is more likely if borrower mobility is higher(Pagaon and Jappelli, 1993) and if asymmetric information
problems are more important (Brown and Zehnder, 2010). It has also been shown through empirical research
that, information sharing is correlated with higher access to credit (Pagaon and Jappelli, 1993), especially in
developing countries with inefficient creditor rights (Djankov et al., 2007), but lower lending to low-quality
borrowers (Hertzberg et al., 2011). Another way to reduce asymmetric information is the use of collateral.
This signalling method is consistent with some research that claim that banks can use collateral in debt
contracts to overcome information asymmetries, in particular arising from ex-ante adverse selection (Berger
et al., 2011). A confident manager lacking physical collateral can sign for low job protection to prove his
confidence in his managerial abilities. This scenario is consistent with the findings of previous research such
as the ones in (Subramanian and Sheikh, 2002). Misreporting is one of the biggest problems in Musharakah
contracts. Misreporting occurs when the agent under declares the profitability of the project. To reduce this
problem, Al –Suwailem (Al-Suwailem, 2006) proposes a higher due diligence from an Islamic institution as
compared to conventional banks. Also, it is proposed that the entrepreneur’s participation in the capital and
the submission of a warranty can resolve the asymmetric information problem (Karim, 2002). We should
state however, that one cannot ask for a warranty against performance as this is not permissible under the
Shari’ah law. Yet, the recourse to a warranty is allowed when negligence or non-respect of the contract
terms by the entrepreneur are proven.
The use of game theory to tackle agency problems in Islamic finance, in general, and particularly, in
Musharakah contracts, is very modest in nature. Some implicit research in this area state that the agency
problem is based on an unfair distribution of returns if the project fails (Shaikh, 2011). Taking into con-
sideration the risks related to a project, it is proposed that the financial institution may require a higher
sharing ratio. In line with the same concept, one research proposes higher incentives for risky projects and
lower compensation schemes for less risky projects (Yousfi, 2013). However, giving fewer shares to the
entrepreneur may result in less motivation and therefore lower projects returns.
To induce the entrepreneur to exert high effort strategy and therefore reduce moral hazard, a research sug-
gested a minimum capital contribution by the entrepreneur given a minimum sharing ratio (Nabi, 2013).
Another research proposed the usage of two sharing ratios instead of one to reflect the effort of
the entrepreneur compared to the financier (Maheran, 2010). This model, however, suffers from the non-
treatment of asymmetric information.
Some explicit research tackled the issue of moral hazards and adverse selection in PLS contracts.
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For example, in a previous paper an incentive mechanism approach using game theory was introduced to
deal with moral hazards. It theoretically allows for higher social value, more freedom to the agent in terms
of negotiating the profit sharing ratio, and induced the agents to contribute more with capital (ELFakir and
Tkiouat, 2015a).
In another research a new proposed model called ROMCA (EL Fakir and Tkiouat, 2016) was
evaluated in relation to other forms of financing like ROSCA and debt contracts. There was a simulation
evidence that the ROMCA model can dominate the other forms under adverse random shocks with low
market conditions and prevailed in cases of moral hazards (EL Fakir and Tkiouat, 2016).
In order to help financial institution in their agent selection process, we have developed three ad-
verse selection indices in mudaraba financing (a specific form of Musharakah where the financier is the sole
provider of funds). These indices should help financial institutions in reducing adverse selection(ELFakir
and Tkiouat, 2016a).
In another paper, we tried to test whether the use of a two-contract menu can reduce asymmetric
information in an environment of incomplete information. We found a game theoretical evidence that menu
contracting is not, always, the optimal option for asymmetric information reduction(ELFakir and Tkiouat,
2016b).
In the same line, we have proposed in another paper the offering of an effort-based Vs output-
based contract. In the effort-based contract the remuneration of the agent is assessed ex-post based on effort
provided. the project financing can continue, even if it fails in the first stage, if the assessment of profit was
positive. The second contract reimburses the agent only based on the project output regardless of the effort
provided by the agent. This means that the refinancing can only occur if the output is satisfactory. We found
a game theoretical evidence that an effort based contract can give higher compensation to the agent as this
contract offers a lower sharing ratio to the financier(ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015b). This result emphasizes
two important Islamic concepts. First it emphasizes the sentiment of altruism which the financier shows by
taking a smaller profit-sharing ratio. Second it emphasizes the sentiment of positive reciprocity which the
agent exhibits by providing high effort (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015b).
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3. The model
Our model is composed of three agents: A supplier (S), a corporation (C) which is a client of the
supplier and a financier (F). The normal commercial procedure is that the supplier delivers the merchandise
on credit to the corporation making a margin M. The later pays back after a certain credit period. The
drawbacks of this methodology are
• The supplier does not have immediate access to liquidity
• The supplier might not get paid back in case the corporation defaults
• The corporation does not get a discount due to late payment
• The supplier misses the opportunity of investing due to late payments
• The supplier also misses on his payments to his own suppliers. i.e. he cannot pay his suppliers if he
does not get paid on time by his client (the corporation)
To overcome these problems, we propose the introduction of a financial institution which act as a
partner in this cycle and not just as an intermediary.
To illustrate, the corporation (C) would like to get a merchandise worth I . The financier (F) offers
equity financingE = We.I but agrees to deliver the rest of the needed amount I−E = (1−We).I as a loan
to the supplier(S). The supplier delivers the needed merchandise but on an equity base to the corporation. In
this case the supplier as well as the financier are shareholders in the corporation and therefore both have an
interest in the corporation financial reporting.
Our model tries to fix two issues. The first relates to the corporation shirking in terms of providing
the necessary effort to sell the merchandise. If it shirks, losses will be incurred in the form of revenues R
being less than the investment I . The second issue is that of profit misreporting where there is a possibility
that the corporation might hide the actual amount of merchandise it bought from the supplier and therefore
declare lower revenuesR than normal revenuesR. This aspect is possible under total equity financing by the
financier. This case,however, of course, not possible under the hybrid model where the supplier is directly
interested in the corporation financial reporting.
We found it practical to think of the game as a coalition game of two players against one. The
supplier and the financier constitute one player (FS) playing against the corporation (C). The intuition behind
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choosing the financial institution and the supplier playing as one coalition is that both have mutual interest
in having the corporation not shirking and properly reporting its revenues. The corporation has a high
probability not to shirk against the supplier as it values its commercial reputation. To havethe supplier
participate in the game, we propose that the financier provides him with interest free debt. This allows him
to get faster access to liquidity at no interest charges. This also allows the supplier to get his merchandise
from the market at a discount (dm), that he eventually will transfer (sell) to the corporation, at a discount
(dc). given the later discount (dc), the corporation can sell the merchandise at a competitive price. If the
market payoffs to the corporation are favourable, the corporation will share its profit with the financier at an
agreed ratio α. The corporation will also payback its debt to the supplier Wd.I . The later will transfer the
same amount to the financier to redeem his debt.
If the market payoffs are not favorable, the corporation is not obliged to pay the financier equity
We.I . It still however obliged to pay its debt (1−We).I vis-a vis the supplier.
For the financier, this is better than total equity financing. Losing We.I < I is better than losing
all equity I . Also, since the financier has entered into a debt contract with the supplier, it is guaranteed to
get part of its investment Wd.I .
The following diagram illustrates our model:
Figure 1: The Hybrid PLS model using debt and equity
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4. Methodology
To assess the feasibility of the hybrid model, we compare its payoffs to the participants with those
under a total equity financing. We need to take into consideration the discounts dc that the corporation is
offered when it pays immediately for the merchandise as well as the discount dm that the supplier gets from
the wholesalemarket. The supplier makes a net margin Nm which is equivalent to the total of his margin on
salesM and market discounts dm less the discount dc he provides to the corporation. i.e.Nm = M+dm−dc
We try under the two methods of financing to consider the payoffs to each participant under the
shirking and the non-shirking of the corporation. The payoffs are divided to equity share, debt share and
discount share. The profit share of the financier and the supplier are given as αf and αs. The combinations
of the financier’s and supplier’s profit shares is given as αfs = αf + αs. .
4.1. Payoffs under equity financing
Since this is an equity financing, there is no payoffs from debt. The participants, however, have
a payoff from equity and discount share. The following two tables details the payoffs to each participant
under the shirking and the non-shirking of the corporation. Since the supplier is not involved in the equity
financing, his/her share from the profits of the project is αs = 0 and therfore αfs = αf . Therfore his/her
payoff is composed of his/her sales’ net margin Nm.
Table 1: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation shirks under equity financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C 0 0 0 (1− αf )dcI (1− αf )dcI
S 0 0 0 I.Nm I.Nm
F [R− I] 0 0 αfIdc [R− I(1− αfdc)]
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Table 2: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation does not shirk in terms of effort but misreport revenues under equity
financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C [R− I](1− αf ) 0 (1− P )(R−R) (1− αf )dcI [R− I(1− dc)](1− αfs) + (1− P )(R−R)
S 0 0 0 I.Nm I.Nm
F [R− I]αf 0 P (R−R) αfIdc [R− I(1− dc)]αf + P (R−R)
Table 3: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation does not shirk in terms of effort and does not misreport revenues
under equity financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C [R− I](1− αf ) 0 0 (1− αf )dcI [R− I(1− dc)](1− αf )
S 0 0 0 I.Nm I.Nm
F [R− I]αf 0 0 αfIdc [R− I(1− dc)]αf
4.2. Payoffs under hybrid financing
Since this is a hybrid financing, there is a payoff from debt, equity and discount share. The
financier, however, has no income from debt since the model assumes an interest free debt. Unlike the equity
case, there is no payoffs from misreporting to the corporation as this strategy is dominated by true-reporting.
In other words, the monitoring advantage provided by the hybrid model, allows the financier and the supplier
to reclaim back the misreported profit and share it according to their stake in the business. This is given in
table 5 where the financier and the supplier claim backWe(R−R) and (1−We)(R−R) respectively in the
case of misreporting. This, therefore, gives no benefits to the corporation from misreporting. The following
tables details the payoffs to each participant under the shirking and the non-shirking of the corporation.
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Table 4: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation shirks in terms of effort under Hybrid financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C 0 0 0 (1− αfs)(dc +Nm)I (1− αfs)(dc +Nm)I
S [R− I]We −(1−We)I 0 I.Nm R− I[1− .Nm − αfsdc]
F [R− I]We +(1−We) 0 αfsIdc [R− I]We + (1−We)I + αfsdcI)]
Table 5: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation does not shirks in terms of effort but misreport profits under hybrid
financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C [R− I](1− αfs) 0 0 (1− αfs)(dc +Nm)I [R− I(1− dc −Nm)](1− αfs)
S [R− I]αs +(1−We)I (1−We)(R−R) αsI(dc +Nm) R− I(1− dc −Nm) +
(1−We)(R−R)
F [R− I]αf −(1−We)I We(R−R) αfI(dc +Nm) [R − I(1 − dc − Nm)]αf +
We(R−R)
Table 6: Payoffs to the game participants when the corporation does not shirks in terms of effort and does not misreport profits
under hybrid financing
Equity Share Debt Share Misreporting Discount Share Total
C [R− I](1− αfs) 0 0 (1− αfs)(dc +Nm)I [R− I(1− dc −Nm)](1− αfs)
S [R− I]αs +(1−We)I 0 αsI(dc +Nm) [R− I(1− dc −Nm)]αs
F [R− I]αf - (1-W˙e) I 0 αfI(dc +Nm) [R− I(1− dc −Nm)]αf
5. Main Results
We now provide a game theoretical approach with the supplier and the financier forming a coali-
tion against the corporation shirking. The payoffs of each game participants are simply extracted from the
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tables above by adding the supplier’s payoff to the financier payoff who now constitute one player. The
strategy of the financier/ supplier (FS) are to offer Equity financing or Hybrid Financing. The strategies of
the corporation are three: “Shirking (S)” (providing less effort), “Not Shirk + Misreporting (NSM)”, “Not
Shirk + True-Reporting (NST)”.
We have then the following normal form game. In each of the payoff cells, two payoffs are presented. The
first payoff is for the financier/supplier (FS). The second is the corporation payoff.
Corporation
Shirk Not Shirk+True Reporting Not Shirk+Misreporting
Fi
na
nc
ie
r
Hybrid Ufs(H,S) ; UC(S,H) Ufs(H,NST );UC(NST,H) Ufs(H,NSM);UC(NSM,H)
Pure Equity Ufs(E,S) ; UC(S,E) Ufs(E,NST );UC(NST,E) Ufs(E,NSM);UC(NSM,E)
Where under the hybrid model, the payoffs to the participants under the corporation three strate-
gies are: UFS(H,NST ) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)]αfs
UC(NST,H) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)](1− αfs)
UFS(H,NSM) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)]αfs +R−R
UC(NSM,H) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)](1− αfs)
UFS(H,S) = [R− I[1−Nm − αfsdc]
UC(S,H) = dc.I.(1− αfs)
And under the Pure Equity financing model, the payoffs to the participants under the corporation
three strategies are:
UFS(E,NST ) = αf [R− I.(1− dc)] + INm
UC(NST,E) = (1− αf )[(R− I.(1− dc)]
UFS(E,NSM) = αf [R− I.(1− dc)] + INm + P (R−R)
UC(NSM,E) = (1− αf )[(R− I.(1− dc)] + (1− P )(R−R)
UFS(E,S) = [R− I.(1− dc)] + INm
UC(S,E) = (1− αfs).dc.I
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5.1. Shirking as a dominated strategy
5.1.1. Under hybrid financing
Should the coalition (FS) opt for a hybrid financing, the difference in payoffs to the corporation
under true-reporting, and misreporting, given the shirking and non shirking cases, would be:
UC(NST,H)− UC(S,H) = [R− I.(1−Nm)](1− αfs) > 0 (1)
UC(NSM,H)− UC(S,H) = [R− I.(1−Nm)](1− αfs) > 0 (2)
It is clear from (1) and (2) that, under hybrid financing, ”Not shirking” (whether with misreporting
or not) is better for the company than ”Shirking”.
5.1.2. Under Pure Equity Financing
If the coalition (FS) opt for an equity financing the corporation gets the following:
UC(NST,E) = (1− αf )[(R− I.(1− dc)]
UC(NSM,E) = (1− αf )[(R− I.(1− dc)] + (1− P )(R−R)
UC(S,E) = (1− αfs).dc.I
Taking the difference of payoffs between the strategies we get:
UC(NST,E)− UC(S,E) = [R− I](1− αfs) > 0 (3)
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UC(NSM,E)− UC(S,E) = [R− I](1− αfs) + (1− P )(R−R) > 0 (4)
It is clear from (3) and (4) that, under Equity financing, ”Not shirking” (whether with misreporting
or not) is better for the company than ”shirking”.
5.1.3. New normal form of the game
We conclude then from (1) (2) (3) (4) that Not shirking (whether with misreporting or not) dom-
inates shirking. This strategy, then, can safely be excluded from the analysis. The following table presents
the new normal form of the game after eliminating shirking as adominated strategy
Table 7: The new normal form of the game after eliminating shirking as a dominated strategy
Corporation
Not Shirk+True Reporting Not Shirk+Misreporting
Fi
na
nc
ie
r
Hybrid Ufs(H,NST );UC(NST,H) Ufs(H,NSM);UC(NSM,H)
Pure Equity Ufs(E,NST );UC(NST,E) Ufs(E,NSM);UC(NSM,E)
5.2. Nash Equilibrium
To look for a Nash equilibrium over which the participants will settle, we start by comparing
the payoff to the corporation under true-reporting and misreporting while the (FS) coalition has chosen the
Hybrid model and the equity model respectively.
5.2.1. Result 1: Good Nash equilibrium
Under the (FS) hybrid strategy, the difference between the corporation’s payoffs from true and
misreporting is:
UC(NST,H)− UC(NSM,H) = R−R = ∆R > 0 (5)
This means that, under the hybrid strategy, true profit reporting is better in terms of payoff to the
corporation than misreporting.
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We look then for the best strategy of the financier if the corporation truly report its revenues. To do so we
compare the payoff to the (FS) coalition under hybrid and equity financing:
UFS(H,NST ) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)]αfs
UFS(E,NST ) = αf [R− I.(1− dc)] + INm
Taking the difference we get:
UFS(H,NST )− UFS(E,NST ) = [R− I.(1− dc)]αs − INmαc
So, for hybrid financing to prevail against equity financing, the share of the supplier needs to be greater than
a threshold value αs1. Namely we must have:
αs > αs1 =
I.Nm
R− I.(1− dc)
αc (6)
Based on (6) hybrid financing and revenue true reporting (H , NST) constitute a Nash equilibrium.
This is a good Nash equilibrium as it induces the corporation to truly report its revenue.
5.2.2. Result 2:Bad Nash equilibrium
Similarly, we test for the best response of the corporation under pure equity financing.
Under the (FS) equity strategy, the difference between the corporation’s payoffs from true-reporting
and misreporting is:
UC(NST,E)− UC(NSM,E) = ∆R[P − αf ] (7)
This is more likely to be negative for the following reasons:
• Equity financing (with single monitoring) is riskier compared to hybrid financing (with double moni-
toring). There is therefore lower chance P of recovering any misreported profits.
• Equity financing, therefore, suffer from higher agency problem and,hence, the financier requires a
higher sharing ratio αf
The above arguments therefore, states that the corporation would most likely engage in mis-
reporting under total equity financing. From the above discussion, the relevant comparison to the fi-
nancier/Supplier is between the case of true reporting under hybrid financing and misreporting under equity
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financing. In other words the relevant difference in the payoffs to be considered is: UFS(H,NST ) −
UFS(E,NSM)
UFS(H,NST )− UFS(E,NSM) = [R− I.(1− dc −Nm)]αfs − αf [R− I.(1− dc)]− INm − P (R−R)
Recalling that αfs = αf + αs , αfs + αc = 1 and simplifying we get:
So, for Equity financing to prevail against Hybrid financing, the share of the supplier needs to be
less than a threshold value αs2. Namely we must have:
αs < αs2 =
I.Nmαc −∆R[αf − P ]
R− I.(1− dc)
(8)
The financier preference for equity financing when αs < αs2 induces the corporation to engage
into misreporting. This is considered as a bad Nash Equilibrium
6. Avoiding the bad Nash Equilibrium
From (6) the corporation engages in true reporting if αs > αs1. Equally likely, from (8), the
financier would prefer hybrid financing if αs > αs2
This means that for Hybrid financing with true reporting to prevail against equity financing with
misreporting we must have:
αs > Max{αs1, αs2} (9)
Conclusion
In this research, we have tried to reduce the moral hazard problem in financial contracting using
a hybrid financing model. The moral hazard in this research manifests itself in two aspects: Shirking (less
effort) and revenue misreporting. We found game theoretical evidence of three results. First, under both
equity and hybrid financing, the corporation’s shirking strategy is dominated by non-shirking (whether under
true-reporting or misreporting). Second, a good Nash equilibrium exists under a hybrid financing model
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where the corporation is induced to truly report revenues. A bad Nash equilibrium where the corporation
is induced to misreport revenues under equity financing. The supplier’s share in hybrid financing should
exceed a given threshold to ensure, from one side, his her participation in the contract and, from the other
side, the corporation’s engagement in the provision of high effort and true reporting.
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